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Rational Profiling in America’s Airports
I. INTRODUCTION
America was indelibly changed on September 11, 2001. Early that
morning, American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175
departed Boston for Los Angeles. Both aircraft were hijacked by
members of Usama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda terrorist network. All nineteen
hijackers were male, between twenty and forty-five years old, and of
Middle Eastern descent.1 Armed with box-cutters, hijackers took control
of these aircraft, altered the flight courses, and crashed them into the twin
towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. That same
morning, American Airlines Flight 77 departed Washington’s Dulles
Airport for Los Angeles, was hijacked, and crashed into the Pentagon.
United Airlines Flight 93 left Newark Airport for San Francisco, was
hijacked and crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.2 An estimated
3,000 people were killed in these attacks.3
Before September 11, the 1983 truck bombings of U.S. and French
military barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, which claimed a total of 295 lives,
stood as the deadliest act of terrorism in United States history. The
September 11 attacks “produced casualty figures more than ten times
those of the 1983 barracks attacks.”4
September 11 underscored many of the trends in international
terrorism identified in recent years by the FBI, CIA, and other
intelligence-gathering agencies. The attacks were the first suicide attacks
1. Federation for American Immigration Reform, World Trade Center and Pentagon
Terrorist’s
Identity
and
Immigration
Status
(last
visited
Oct.10,
2001)
http://www.fairus.org/html/04178101.htm.
2. U.S. Department of Justice, Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft Sept. 11, 2001
(last visited Mar. 26, 2002) http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/agcrisisremarks.htm.
3. The count of September 11 victims has continued to change more than one year since the
attacks. As of October 7, 2002, the “official toll” kept by the New York City Police Department
listed 2,797 victims. See The Sacramento Bee, World Trade Center victims list drops below 2,800
(last visited Nov. 8, 2002) http://www.sacbee.com/ 24hour/special_reports/terrorism/story/565774p4447662c.html. The number of victims at the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania have remained at 184
and 40, respectively. See Official count of victims of Sept. 11 attacks (last visited Nov. 8, 2002)
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/nation/1570718.
4. FBI, Statement for the Record of Dale L. Watson, Executive Assistant Director
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, on The Terrorist Threat
Confronting the United States (Feb. 6, 2002) http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/
watson020602.htm.
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by international terrorists within the United States.5 The attacks
demonstrated an apparent shift in some terrorist organizations from
formally structured groups to loosely affiliated, decentralized cells.
September 11 also exemplified a change in tactics and methodologies
among international terrorists to focus on producing mass casualties. 6
Contrary to their intended purpose, the September 11 attacks
galvanized the United States and its resolve to combat terrorism. Military
operations against Al-Qaeda elements in Afghanistan began within
weeks of September 11, and resulted in the nearly complete destruction
of the Taliban infrastructure. President Bush signed the “Aviation and
Transportation Security Act” into law in November 2001.7 This law
makes airport security personnel federal employees, implements Sky
Marshal programs, and creates a new Federal Transportation Security
Administration (FTSA) to oversee the security operations of all modes of
commercial passenger transportation.8 As of October 1, 2002, the U.S.
Department of Justice had designated 39 groups as “terrorist
organizations” and frozen the assets of 62 organizations that support
terrorism.9
Despite the success of these measures according to the FBI, the
threat of terrorism represents “a significant challenge to the United States
for the foreseeable future.”10 Terrorists will likely continue to “focus on
attacks that yield significant destruction and high casualties, thus
maximizing worldwide media attention and public anxiety.”11

5. Id.
6. Id. The threat of domestic terrorism (acts perpetrated within the United States by U.S.
citizens, without foreign direction) is no less significant. Between 1980 and 2000, the FBI recorded
335 incidents or suspected incidents of terrorism in this country. Of these, 247 were attributed to
domestic terrorists, while 88 were determined to be international in origin. Id.
7. Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 105, 115 Stat. 597, 607-08 (2001).
8. Robert Longley, New Airport Security Measures (Nov. 18, 2001)
http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/ aa111801a.htm.
9. Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft (last visited November 8, 2002)
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/ 100102agremarkstousattorneysconference.htm. America’s
responses have not been purely punitive. Private donations to the victims of the September 11
attacks have totaled more than $1 billion dollars. See The September 11th Fund (last visited Mar. 26,
2002) http://www.uwnyc.org/sep11/; See also United Way, of America (last visited Mar. 26, 2002)
http://national.unitedway.org/index.cfm; CNN, Red Cross Unveils Plan for September 11 Funds
(Jan. 31, 2002) http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/31/ rec.liberty.fund/. Between October 2001 and
March 1, 2002, the World Food Program delivered 333,000 tons of food to Afghanistan. See The
Iowa Channel, War on Terrorism: At a Glance (Mar. 26, 2002) http://www.theiowachannel.
com/news/960658/detail.html. In the months following September 11, the United States sent ten
shipments of medical supplies to Afghanistan, enough to support 100,000 people for three months.
Id. The United States also provided nearly $4.4 million to provide food, shelter, clothing, and
medicine and school supplies through America’s Fund for Afghan Children. Id.
10. FBI, supra note 4, at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/watson020602.htm.
11. Id.
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This paper focuses on legal issues surrounding security measures at
airports, measures that could have prevented the September 11 tragedy
and will serve to protect against similar attacks in the future. Particularly,
this paper seeks to answer the following question: Should the FTSA
incorporate consideration of race, gender, and age into airport profiling
procedures?
Such a suggestion raises legitimate concerns and
constitutional arguments.12 “Racial profiling of any kind is anathema to
our criminal justice system.”13 The alternative argument, however, seems
equally compelling. “Today we’re at war with a terror network that just
killed [3,000] innocents and has anonymous agents in our country
planning more slaughter. Are we really supposed to ignore the one
identifiable fact we know about them?”14
II. RICHARD KIMBLE: A PROFILING EXAMPLE
In the 1993 movie The Fugitive,15 Harrison Ford played Dr. Richard
Kimble, an affluent Chicago surgeon who returns home one night to find
his wife murdered and her murderer – a one-armed man – escaping.
Kimble is charged with the crime, convicted, sent to prison, then escapes
and spends the rest of the movie tracking down the one-armed man using
a fairly straightforward methodology. First, he compares the type of
prosthetic arm he had seen the murderer wearing to a hospital’s database
and compiles a list of people who had been fitted with such a device.
Kimble then uses other factors (such as the age of the patient, whether
the prosthetic arm was on the right or left-hand, etc.) to narrow the list to
five candidates. He then tracks down each candidate, one of whom turns
out to be his wife’s murderer. The one-armed man is arrested and Kimble
exonerated.
Perhaps Richard Kimble was on to something. Imagine what would
have happened had Kimble conducted his search without considering
“the one identifiable fact [he] knew about [the murderer].”16 He would
have spent years searching the entire population of Chicago, two-armed

12. Much of this paper will compare airport profiling to incidents of racial profiling,
primarily because legal issues surrounding racial discrimination predominate over the relatively
minor issues of age discrimination (targeting adults) and gender discrimination (targeting males).
Nevertheless, the emphasis of this paper deals with incorporating scrutiny of all three characteristics
(race, gender, and age) into airport profiling techniques.
13. Martinez v. Mt. Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 780, 782 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
14. Michael Kinsley, Racial Profiling at the Airport, SLATE (last visited Sept. 28, 2001)
http://slate.msn.com/?id=116347. This article stated there were 6,000 September 11 victims, but
more recent estimates have lowered the casualty count to slightly more than 3,000. See The Iowa
Channel, supra note 9, at http://www.theiowachannel.com/news/960658/detail.html.
15. The Fugitive (Warner Bros. 1993).
16. Kinsley, supra note 14, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=116347.
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and one-armed alike, male and female, young and old, black, white,
Hispanic, Asian, and so on. Faced with such a daunting task, he likely
would have given up his search and turned himself in to the U.S.
Marshals.
Consider this example in light of the September 11 attacks. All
nineteen hijackers were adult males of middle-eastern ethnicity.17 What
might happen if America ignores the identifiable facts we know about
hijackers? The FTSA must decide whether to modify current profiling
procedures to include consideration of race, gender, and age. The
following sections will discuss some of the legal arguments for and
against such a policy, compare and contrast airport profiling to other
instances of profiling, and explain current airport profiling procedures.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF PROFILING
Modifying airport profiling procedures to include scrutiny of race,
gender, and age has the potential to impact fundamental constitutional
rights. Such a possibility requires us to consider the constitutional and
legal ramifications of profiling before such changes are implemented.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the creation or enforcement of
“any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”18 The Equal Protection
Clause “prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race” and is the “the constitutional basis for
objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws.”19 Several
recent cases have discussed racial profiling, particularly where police use
race as the sole factor in pulling over black motorists. 20
17. Fifteen of the September 11 terrorists were from Saudi Arabia, two were from the United
Arab Republic, and the remaining two were from Egypt and Lebanon, respectively. See
http://www.fairus.org/html/04178101.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2002).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The modifications to airport profiling procedures
discussed in this paper could have an impact on any airline passenger whose combined
characteristics (race, gender, age, method of purchasing ticket, etc.) warrant heightened scrutiny.
Since both U.S. citizens as well as non-citizens could incur such scrutiny, discussion of Fourteenth
Amendment implications is relevant.
19. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Despite assumptions to the contrary, the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and requirement of
“probable cause” do not appear to apply to these circumstances. See Id. C.f. U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975), which held that the Fourth Amendment “applies to all seizures of the
person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.”
20. This issue is commonly called “DWB” – “driving while black.” See Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119 (2000); Chavez v. Ill. St. Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Montero
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); Martinez v. Mt. Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 780, 782
(N.D. Ill. 2000); U.S. v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D. Mass. 1998); Chavez v. Ill. St. Police, 251
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Judicial consensus, expressed in varying degrees of emphasis, is that
“the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race.”21 Although use of race and ethnicity for
such purposes has been severely limited,22 such use has never been
precluded:
All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism
never can.23

Reliance on “racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most
searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with
constitutional guarantees.”24 The qualified language of these decisions
demonstrates judicial recognition of circumstances where profiling race
may have “probative value”25 and, having passed “a most searching
examination,”26 be utilized by law enforcement and security personnel.
Did the September 11 attacks, carried out by Middle Eastern adult
males, create such circumstances? Could their race, gender, and age have
had probative value had such factors been included in airport profiling
procedures? Does the threat of further terrorist attacks warrant such
measures? Answers to these questions may be found by examining
historical examples of mandated restrictions on civil liberties during
wartime, as well as contemporary instances of racial profiling.
A. Clarification of Terms: Discrimination and Profiling
Discussions of race and similar “hot-button issues”27 are often
hindered by divergent interpretations of certain words or phrases. For
example, the term “discrimination,” as applied to most legal issues, is
frequently perceived as having an inherently negative connotation. The
Supreme Court recent noted, “many [traffic] stops never lead to an arrest,
which further exacerbates the perceptions of discrimination felt by racial

F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001). For further discussion regarding DWB, see infra p. 17.
21. Whren v. U.S.,517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
22. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
23. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
24. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1134, (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S.
267, 273, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986))).
25. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1134.
26. Id.
27. Corpwatch, Bush Urged to Support Anti-Racism Summit (July 31, 2001)
http://www.corpwatch.org/bulletins/PBD.jsp?articleid=408.
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minorities and people living in high crime areas.”28 The unspoken
assumption is that discrimination based on race is always suspect.
Indeed, some courts feel “it is critical that our legal system assist in the
elimination of all racial discrimination. We must constantly strive to
ensure that race plays no role in the day-to-day operation of our justice
system.”29
Similarly, “racial profiling” is often understood to have a negative
implication, which is that race (or whatever status is being
“discriminated” against or “profiled”) is the only factor justifying
increased scrutiny by police or other security officials. For example, the
court in Lemon v. MTS noted that “[d]efendants’ employee . . . utilized
racial profiling as the sole basis for detaining plaintiff.”30 The court
understood “racial profiling” to mean that race was the only
consideration used in that case.
Employment-related matters are another area of law involving
frequent allegations of discrimination. Although race-based
discrimination in employment is immediately suspect, some scholars
have noted that it may be rational in some circumstances.31 As a rule,
“the law prohibits even such ‘rational’ discrimination because of this
society’s long history of racial injustice and the harmful effects of racebased decisions.”32 However, the law does not always require an ipso
facto rejection of discrimination. “Rational discrimination against
persons with disabilities is constitutionally permissible in a way that
rational discrimination against religious practices is not.”33
Absolutist interpretation of terms such as “profiling” and
“discrimination” is unwarranted, because racial discrimination, as well as
other forms of discrimination, is not unconstitutional on its face.
Virtually every major statement on racial discrimination or racial
profiling is qualified or limited in some sense. “Racial discriminations
are in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited.”34
“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded

28. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 133 (2000) (emphasis added).
29. Martinez v. Mt. Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 780, 781 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (emphasis added).
30. Lemon v. MTS, 2001 WL 872639 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
31. See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1976); Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
513, 516 (1987).
32. Pauline Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections
for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NWULR 1497, 1518 (Summer, 2002).
33. Erickson v. Board of Governors of St. Coll. and Univ. for N.E. Ill., 207 F.3d 945, 951
(7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
34. Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (emphasis added).
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upon the doctrine of equality.”35 “All legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect . . . [and]
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”36 The law can and
does accommodate a distinction between legally permissible “rational”
discrimination and impermissible antagonistic discrimination.
“Antidiscrimination laws are not predicated upon the existence of
economically ‘rational’ discrimination; the problem that exists and which
such laws target is, to a large extent, stubborn but irrational prejudice.”37
Such a distinction is vital when discussing airport profiling. For
example, racial profiling is “generally understood to mean the improper
use of race as a basis for taking law enforcement action.”38 This
unspoken generalization is sometimes harmful, because failure to
acknowledge or articulate the distinction between “proper” and
“improper” discrimination leads to a fading of that important difference.
Given the urgent need to improve security at our airports, this distinction
must be clarified and brought to the forefront of any discussions
regarding profiling.
Many arguments posited against profiling rely on a blurring of the
line between prejudicial, animus-based discrimination and measured,
rational, controlled profiling. “If ‘racial profiling’ means anything
specific at all, it means rational discrimination: racial discrimination with
a non-racist rationale.”39 Profiling or other discriminatory measures
which use race as the sole factor are virtually useless from a practical
point of view. But measures which consider multiple factors, including
race, gender, and age, may be justified in certain circumstances. Our
judicial system has recognized that extremely urgent situations – such as
wartime – may require restrictions on civil liberties that would normally
be facially unconstitutional.40
B. A “Clear and Present Danger”?
During World War I, Congress passed the Espionage Act, which
forbade speech inciting insubordination or refusal to serve in the armed
forces of the United States.41 A number of subsequent cases resulted in

35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (emphasis added).
37. Lam v. University of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
38. Chavez v. Illinois. St. Police, 251 F.3d 612, 620 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
39. Kinsley, supra note 14, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=116347.
40. See infra B. “A ‘Clear and Present danger,’” ? which discusses this issue in more detail.
41. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. XI, 40 Stat. 228-30, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
611-33 (1925).
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the “Clear and Present Danger” test.42 Although those cases centered on
the First Amendment right to free speech, the reasoning from them can
be applied to our current situation:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so
long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by
any constitutional right.43

Does the current situation facing America – the ongoing threat of
terrorism – justify the inclusion of race, gender, and age in profiling
procedures at airports and other ports of entry? Are such measures
proportional in “proximity and degree” to the danger of terrorist
hijackings? Our society has gone to great lengths to avoid facing the
painful truth that, in some circumstances, race can have probative value.
A recent article in The Atlantic summarized the situation rather well:
The mathematical probability that a randomly chosen Arab passenger
might attempt a mass-murder-suicide hijacking—while tiny—is
considerably higher than the probability that a randomly chosen white,
black, Hispanic, or Asian passenger might do the same. In
constitutional-law parlance, while racial profiling may be
presumptively unconstitutional, that presumption is overcome in the
case of airline passengers, because the government has a compelling
interest in preventing mass-murder-suicide hijackings, and because
close scrutiny of Arab-looking people is narrowly tailored to protect
44
that interest.

America faces a “clear and present danger” of hijackers taking
control of airplanes and either killing passengers or using these aircraft
as flying bombs. All nineteen terrorists involved in the September 11
attacks belonged to the “Al-Qaeda terrorist network headed by Usama
Bin Laden [which has] clearly emerged as the most urgent threat to U.S.
interests.”45 These hijackers were exclusively adult males of Middle
Eastern ethnicity.46
42. See Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919);
and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 625, 632 (1925).
43. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
44. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Case for Using Racial Profiling at Airports, ATLANTIC (last
visited Sept. 25, 2001) http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2001-09-25.htm.
45. FBI, supra note 4, at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/watson020602.htm.
46. Federation for American Immigration Reform, supra note 1, at http://www.fairus.org/
html/04178101.htm.
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America must eliminate this danger in such a way as to minimize the
impact on the civil liberties of minority groups such as OMEAs (people
who are “of middle eastern appearance”47) while maximizing our
opportunity to prevent similar attacks in the future. The decision to
include consideration of race, gender, and age in airport profiling must
not be based on animus or used as a pretext to target a specific ethnic
group. Nevertheless, America must also consider whether the current
emergent circumstances warrant adopting security measures that could
be otherwise construed as infringing on civil liberties.
C. Examples of Questionable Discrimination
America’s checkered history of race relations no doubt contributes to
its hesitancy to adopt security measures that, though initially wellintentioned, might eventually become a pretext for inappropriate
discrimination against minorities. Some of our country’s most regrettable
episodes occurred during attempts to shore up national security,
including the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 and Civil War measures
such as President Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.48
Implementing a profiling system that includes consideration of race,
gender, and age must be done with the standards of “rigid scrutiny”49
mandated by the Supreme Court. 50
This section examines two instances of race-based discrimination in
our nation’s history: the Japanese internment camps during World War II
and the more recent instances of “driving while black.”51 This section
also attempts to identify differences between these events and the
modified profiling procedures that could be implemented in airports.
These fundamental differences, both in rationale and implementation,
distinguish airport profiling from the unfortunate discrimination faced by
Japanese-Americans during World War II.

47. John Derbyshire, At First Glance: Racial Profiling, Burning Hotter, NAT’L REV. ONLINE
(visited Oct. 5, 2001) http://www.nationalreview.com/derbyshire/derbyshire100501.shtml.
48. Alien Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570; Sedition Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 596; see also Ken Armstrong, Many Fear Loss of Freedoms, CHI. TRIB. (Visited Sept.
16, 2001) http://www.chicagotribune.com/ news/specials/chi-0109160286sep16.story?coll=chinewsspecials-hed.
49. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
50. As columnist Stuart Taylor noted in The Atlantic, “The emergency measures adopted
now could be with us for decades, because this emergency is not going away. So we’d better be
careful. History is replete with hasty emergency legislation that we later came to regret—from the
Alien and Sedition Acts to the detention camps for Japanese-Americans—and with abuses of the
new powers years later by officials whose invocations of national security proved overblown or even
fraudulent.” Taylor, supra note 44, at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2001-09-25.htm.
51. Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 1996).
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1. Japanese internment during World War II
On December 8, 1941, one day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor by
a Japanese air force, Congress declared war against Japan. Two months
later, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066,
which stated, “the successful prosecution of the war requires every
possible protection against . . . sabotage.”52 This order authorized the
Secretary of War to prescribe military areas “from which any or all
persons may be excluded.”53 In February, 1942, General J.L. DeWitt,
Military Commander of the Western Defense Command, issued the first
of two proclamations. The first proclamation established “military areas
and zones” comprising “the southern part of Arizona [and] all the coastal
region of the three Pacific Coast states.”54 The second proclamation
issued weeks later expanded these areas.55
President Roosevelt then issued Executive Order 9102 establishing
the “War Relocation Authority.”56 Under these authorities, an estimated
120,000 Japanese internees – two-thirds of who were United States
citizens57 – were removed from America’s west coast, home to many
military bases and manufacturing plants. These areas were considered
vulnerable to Japanese attack.58 President Roosevelt also appointed a
commission to evaluate “what, if any, dereliction . . . in the American
chain of command that allowed the Japanese to take the Americans
completely by surprise.”59 This Commission found evidence of extensive
espionage conducted prior the attack on Pearl Harbor.60
Numerous lawsuits were filed as a result of these forced relocations.
In Hirabayashi v. United States, an American-born Japanese man
52. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 FR 1407, 1942 WL 4050 (Pres.); see also Hirabayashi v. U.S.,
320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943).
53. Id. at 86.
54. Id. at 86-87.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and
a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 75 (1998).
58. Declan McCullagh, Why Liberty Suffers in Wartime, WIRED NEWS (Sept. 24, 2001)
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,47051,00.html.
59. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME, 189
(Alfred A. Knopf 1998).
60. Id. at 189-90, which states:”There were . . . Japanese spies on the Island of Oahu [some
of whom] were Japanese consular agents and others were persons having no open relations with the
Japanese foreign service. These spies collected, and through various channels transmitted,
information to the Japanese Empire respecting the military and naval establishments and dispositions
on the Island . . . [The Japanese knew] the exact location of vital air fields, hangars, and other
structures. They also knew accurately where certain important naval vessels would be berthed. Their
fliers had the most detailed maps, courses, and bearings, so that each could attack a given vessel or
field. Each seems to have been given a specified mission.”
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disobeyed the curfew requirement imposed by the military pursuant to
President Roosevelt’s executive order.61 Although the Court recognized
that racial discrimination is “by [its] very nature odious to a free
people,”62 it upheld the constitutionality of these measures:
[T]he danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of
threatened invasion, calls upon the military authorities to scrutinize
every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger
areas. Because racial discriminations are in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited, it by no means follows that, in
dealing with the perils of war, Congress and the Executive are wholly
precluded from taking into account those facts and circumstances
which are relevant to measures for our national defense and for the
successful prosecution of the war, and which may in fact place citizens
of one ancestry in a different category from others . . . The adoption by
Government, in the crisis of war and of threatened invasion, of
measures for the public safety, based upon the recognition of facts and
circumstances which indicate that a group of one national extraction
may menace that safety more than others, is not wholly beyond the
limits of the Constitution and is not to be condemned merely because in
63
other and in most circumstances racial distinctions are irrelevant.

A similar situation arose in Korematsu v. United States, where, as in
Hirabayashi, the Court upheld the security measures, holding that the
government’s actions were not “beyond the war power of Congress and
the Executive.”64 The Court had no doubt that most Japanese-Americans
“were loyal to this country,” but agreed with military authorities that “it
was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the
disloyal.”65 This reasoning apparently had an arguably valid basis:
The judgment that exclusion of the whole group was for the same
reason a military imperative answers the contention that the exclusion
was in the nature of group punishment based on antagonism to those of
Japanese origin. That there were members of the group who retained
loyalties to Japan has been confirmed by investigations made
subsequent to the exclusion. Approximately five thousand American
citizens of Japanese ancestry refused to swear unqualified allegiance to
the United States and to renounce allegiance to the Japanese Emperor,
66
and several thousand evacuees requested repatriation to Japan.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 100-01.
Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944).
Id. at 219-220.
Id. at 219.
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Hirabayashi and Korematsu have since been harshly criticized by
both the courts and civil liberties groups.67 Yet the underlying concept –
that an emergent and genuine threat to the United States as a whole can
supersede even important and fundamental rights – seems particularly
relevant to considerations of airport security in light of September 11.
Further, a number of significant differences exist between the Japanese
internments of World War II and the recent calls for profiling at airports:
• Different Players, Different Goals: Pearl Harbor was a
military target, attacked by a military force. September 11
marked the beginning of a “focus on attacks that yield
significant destruction and high casualties, thus maximizing
worldwide media attention and public anxiety.”68 Japan had
hoped to disable America’s naval capacities with a one-time
strike. Al-Qaeda extremists, on the other hand, adhere to
“the international jihad movement”69 seeking the actual
destruction – not merely disabling – of America.
• Proportional Harm: Some Japanese were interned in camps
during a substantial portion of World War II. Some were
allowed to leave provided that they joined the military or
relocate to the eastern and Midwestern portions of the United
States.70 The degree of harm suffered by the Japanese was
much more serious than what might be experienced by those
who are profiled at airports.71
• Sunset Provision: One of the most unjust attributes of the
Japanese internment episode was its open-endedness. A
policy was formulated in the heat of the moment to get the
Japanese into internment camps, but exit strategies took
quite some time to develop and implement. Modification to
current airport profiling procedures could include a “sunset
provision” requiring that these measures expire unless
Congress acts to extend them.72
67. See e.g., the criticisms of Hirabayashi in U.S. v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988);
Blanton v. U.S., 94 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 1996); Estate of McKinney ex rel. McKinney v. U.S., 71 F.3d
779 (9th Cir. 1995); Moody v. U.S., 874 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Craig, 907 F.2d 653
(7th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988).
68. FBI, supra note 4, at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/watson020602.htm.
69. Id.
70. REHNQUIST, supra note 59, at 200-03.
71. As a recent article noted, “assuming these [profiling] procedures do work, it’s hard to
argue that helping to avoid another Sept. 11 is not worth the imposition, which is pretty small:
inconvenience and embarrassment, as opposed to losing a job or getting lynched.” Kinsley, supra
note 14, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=116347.
72. A sunset provision could also act as a safety valve in case the modified profiling
procedures are ineffective or result in significant civil rights violations.
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2. DWB – “driving while black”
Another controversial form of discrimination is “any action taken by
a state trooper during a traffic stop that is based upon racial or ethnic
stereotypes and that has the effect of treating minority motorists
differently than non-minority motorists.”73 Such pretextual traffic stops
have become known as DWB – “driving while black.”74 Police argue that
profiling young black men is not a matter of racism, but of statistics.
Though black males aged fifteen to twenty-four constitute only one
percent of the population, they are responsible for up to twenty percent
of violent crime.75 Critics of this practice argue “it is unfair . . . to visit
disproportionate burdens upon one segment of the population, defined by
its racial characteristics . . . because race is immutable and therefore
cannot be altered to avoid unwanted disparate treatment.”76 Others
acknowledge the validity of the statistics cited by police in defense of
DWB, but still say that profiling is not a part of good police work.
“Racial profiling poisons the water. It’s one of the things that makes
racial minorities distrust the police and that makes their work more
difficult,” says Harvard law professor Randall Kennedy. “Even if it’s
true, if it works . . . it’s too socially horrible for America.”77 Such
arguments would also seem applicable to persons subjected to increased
scrutiny in airports.
Many other arguments suggest valid and reasonable objections to
DWB profiling.78 Yet, as with the Japanese internment camps, several
significant distinctions arise between DWB and profiling race, gender,
and age at airports. Columnist Stuart Taylor argues,
[DWB] should be deemed unconstitutional even when there is a
statistically valid basis for believing that it will help catch more drug
dealers or violent criminals. . . . This benefit is far outweighed by the
costs: Such racial profiling is hard to distinguish from—and sometimes
involves—plain old racist harassment of groups that have long
73. White v. Williams, 179 F. Supp. 2d 405, 410 (D.N.J. 2002).
74. Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 1996).
75. John Stossel, Rethinking Racial Profiling: How the Attacks Have Changed Views, ABC
NEWS
(Oct. 3, 2001) http://abcnews.go.com/sections/2020/2020/2020_011002_racial
profiling_stossel. html. Interestingly, this particular issue may not have significant support in the
black community. In a recent poll, two out of three NAACP members answered “no” when asked
“Should black cops put pressure on Bush to back anti-racial profiling bills?” See NAACP, Poll
Results, at (last visited Mar. 26, 2002) http://www.naacp.org/polls/results.php.
76. Sherry F. Colb, The New Face of Racial Profiling: How Terrorism Affects The Debate, at
(Oct. 10, 2001) http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20011010.html.
77. Stossel, supra note 75, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/2020/2020/2020_011002_racial
profiling_stossel.html.
78. See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While
Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (Dec 1999).
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experienced discrimination at every stage of the criminal justice
process. It subjects thousands of innocent people to the kind of
humiliation that characterizes police states. It hurts law enforcement in
the long run by fomenting fear and distrust among potential witnesses,
tipsters, and jurors. It is rarely justified by any risk of imminent
violence. And it makes a mockery of conservative preachings that the
Constitution is colorblind.79

Taylor goes on to note four differences between DWB and airport
profiling:
• The rationale for airport profiling (preventing mass murder)
is infinitely more important than the rationale behind DWB
profiling (finding illegal drugs or guns).80
• A virulent perversion of Islam is, so far, the only mass
movement in the world so committed to mass-murdering
Americans that its fanatics are willing to kill themselves in
the process.81
• This movement includes people who have lived legally in
America for years (some of whom may be citizens), so the
risk of weapons being smuggled onto airliners cannot be
eliminated by giving special scrutiny only to foreign
nationals.82
Additional distinctions between these two practices further
demonstrate the plausibility of encouraging one (airport profiling) while
condemning the other (DWB):
• DWB is singularly race-based, which contravenes both the
letter and the spirit of the Constitution. Airport profiling
takes multiple factors into account, such as when the ticket
was purchased, how the subject responds to questions, etc.
• Police employ DWB profiling primarily as a drug
interdiction technique. Because the vast majority of such
interdictions yield a very small quantity of drugs, their social
impact is insignificant (although the aggregate result can
have a substantial effect). Airport profiling, on the other
hand, seeks to eliminate criminal acts that, though singular
and isolated, will have a significant impact on our society.
Some empirical evidence exists to justify both the World War II
internment of ethnic Japanese and the more recent practice of profiling

79. Taylor, supra note 44 at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2001-09-25.htm.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. Legal proscriptions against discrimination notwithstanding, there is no logical reason
to consider nationality but not race, gender, and age.
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black motorists. Nevertheless, the costs of these practices far outweigh
their benefits. The same cannot be said for airport profiling. The crime to
be averted is a significant state interest. A profiling system incorporating
multiple factors – including race, gender, and age – can avoid most, if
not all, of the criticisms leveled against previous single- or dual-factor
profiles.
D. Examples of Rational Discrimination
State-endorsed discrimination is hardly a phenomenon restricted to
World War II. American society currently tolerates – even advocates – a
surprising number of openly discriminatory policies. These practices are
justified by citing societal interests that presumably outweigh the harm
suffered by those groups against which these policies discriminate. This
section explores three examples of discriminatory practices that are
either tolerated or openly encouraged and evaluates whether corollary
arguments can be drawn between these social policies and profiling at
airports. If rational discrimination can further societal interests such as
education opportunities, employment opportunities, and military
cohesiveness, then the law can certainly accommodate rational
discrimination in matters of airport security.
1. Affirmative action
Affirmative action is a general term referring to social policies
calling for “minorities and women to be given special consideration in
employment, education and contracting decisions.”83 Supporters of this
policy claim to be “dedicated to the advancement of affirmative action,
equal opportunity and the elimination of discrimination on the basis of
race, gender, ethnic background or any other criterion that deprives
people of opportunities to live and work.”84 Affirmative action suggests
that the remedy for America’s “long history of racial and sexual
discrimination”85 is, ironically, contemporary preferences based on race
or sex:
In its modern form, affirmative action can call for an admissions
officer faced with two similarly qualified applicants to choose the
minority over the white, or for a manager to recruit and hire a qualified
woman for a job instead of a man. Affirmative action decisions are
83. Dan Froomkin, Affirmative Action Under Attack, WASH. POST (Oct. 1998)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/affirm/affirm.htm.
84. American Association for Affirmative Action, Welcome to Affirmativeaction.org (last
visited March 26, 2002) http://www.affirmativeaction.org/.
85. Froomkin, supra note 83, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
special/affirm/affirm.htm.
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generally not supposed to be based on quotas, nor are they supposed to
give any preference to unqualified candidates. And they are not supposed
to harm anyone through “reverse discrimination.”86
Scrutiny of the comparative costs and benefits of affirmative action
is beyond the scope of this paper.87 That it is a form of intentional, stateendorsed discrimination, however, is beyond question. If peacetime
initiatives may use discriminatory criteria to further racial equality,
should not wartime initiatives similarly use rationally discriminatory
criteria to further “our national defense?”88
2. Military discrimination: homosexuals; women in certain combat roles
Military service “is fundamentally different from civilian life,”89 and
therefore governed by a modified form of jurisprudence. Persons in the
armed forces are subject to “the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
other statutory provisions . . . to which may be added the unwritten
common law of the usage and custom of military service as well as
regulations and authorized by the President as Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces.”90 This body of law, fully recognized by civil courts
in both times of peace and of war,91 provides two more examples of
state-endorsed discrimination: the exclusion of women from certain
combat roles and prohibition against homosexuals serving in any military
capacity.
The United States “has more women in its military than any other
nation,” yet women are still barred from most combat positions.92 This
prohibition stems from the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of

86. Id.
87. There are voluminous legal articles available on this subject. See e.g. Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic, California’s Racial History and Constitutional Rationales for Race-Conscious
Decision Making in Higher Education, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1521 (2000); Robert J. Donahue, Racial
Diversity as a Compelling Governmental Interest, 30 IND. L. REV. 523 (1997); Dinesh D’Souza &
Christopher Edley, Jr., Affirmative Action Debate: Should Race-based Affirmative Action be
Abandoned as a National Policy?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 425 (1996); Lino Graglia, Affirmative Action:
Have Race- and Gender-Conscious Remedies Outlived Their Usefulness? Yes: Reverse
Discrimination Serves No One, A.B.A. J. May 1995, at 40; Jeremy Moeser, Hopwood v. Texas: The
Beginning of the End for Racial Preference Programs in Higher Education, 48 MERCER L. REV. 941
(1997); L. Darnell Weeden, Yo, Hopwood, Sayinging No to Race-Based Affirmative Action is the
Right Thing to Do from an Afrocentric Perspective, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 533 (1996-1997).
88. Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
89. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (1994).
90. Legal Information Institute, Military Law: An Overview
(Mar. 26, 2002)
http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/military.html.
91. Id.
92. Lucinda J. Peach, Women at War: The Ethics of Women in Combat, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & POL’Y 199, (Spring 1994).
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1948,93 which both advanced and limited women’s opportunities in the
armed forces. This Act accomplished four things:
• It gave women permanent status in the military. 94
• It established that women could constitute two percent of all
enlisted personnel, and it limited the number of female
officers to ten percent of the total female enlisted strength.95
• It limited women’s role in the military by excluding women
from combat duties, combat units, and combat ships. (The
Act allowed each branch of service considerable leeway in
determining which assignments it would categorize as
“combat” or “combat-support.”)96
Women, however, are not alone when it comes to discriminatory
military policies. Persons who “demonstrate a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts”97 are prohibited from serving in the Armed
Forces at all. In November 1992, President-Elect Clinton announced that
he planned to lift the military’s long-standing ban on gays and lesbians.98
An extended debate on the issue culminated in a July 1993 compromise,
known as “don’t ask, don’t tell,” allowing homosexuals to serve in the
armed forces “as long as they did not proclaim their homosexuality or
engage in homosexual conduct.”99 This policy also required that military
commanders not try to find out the sexual orientation of personnel.100
The United States Supreme Court has consistently declined to hear cases
involving homosexuals being discharged from the military.101
The armed forces discriminate, in varying degrees, against women,
homosexuals, and even men.102 Regardless of the relative merits of these
policies and their underlying justifications, their existence alone is
sufficient to demonstrate that the Constitution can accommodate
reasoned, rational discrimination in certain circumstances.

93. Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub.L.No. 80-625, 62 Stat. 368
(1948).
94. Pamela R. Jones, Women in the Crossfire: Should The Court Allow It?, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 252 (1993).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15).
98. Facts on File, Issues and Controversies: Gays in the Military (Mar. 6, 1998) http://www.
facts.com/icof/i00062.htm.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Holmes v. California Army Nat. Guard, 525 U.S. 1067 (1999); Richenberg v. Cohen,
522 U.S. 807 (1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 519 U.S. 948 (1996).
102. The current system for military draft inducts only men, a practice which has been upheld
by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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3. Federally funded gender/age discrimination in Louisiana
“State highway safety officials in Louisiana in November 2001
announced they received a $700,000 federal grant to help crack down on
two groups of chronic violators of the state’s seat belt law: drivers and
passengers of pick-up trucks, and all male drivers and passengers
between 18 and 55.”103 Louisiana Highway Safety Commission
Executive Director James Champagne noted that state and federal studies
have consistently shown that pick-up drivers and all male drivers are less
likely to buckle up than any other groups of drivers or front-seat
passengers. “We will be looking at all male drivers, especially those who
drive pickup trucks who refuse to buckle up.” 104 Champagne also plans
on targeting male pickup drivers
“from the Florida Parishes to the New Orleans area to the Houma and
Thibodaux area, [because] that’s where 65 percent of the pickups in the
state are.” Asked if the targeting of males and pickup drivers and
passengers is profiling of a certain group, Champagne said,
“Absolutely . . . [The lack of seat belt use] is a gender problem. It is a
male problem in all parts of the state. It is an 18-to-55 (year-olds)
problem.”105

Rather than couch this discriminatory practice in safer terms, Mr.
Champagne openly acknowledges that he is profiling a certain group of
people based on their gender, age, residence, and type of vehicle, and he
is doing so at government expense. While his application of the law may
be ultimately misguided, his methodology seems fairly logical. He has
approached the problematic behavior with no thoughts of special
treatment – positive or negative – to those participating in it.
E. Profiling at Ports of Entry: Three Examples
The propriety and constitutionality of race, gender, or age
discrimination must be determined according the context in which such
discrimination occurs. The following section describes two situations
where profiling procedures which included consideration of race worked.

103. Ed Anderson, Police to Harness Seat Belt Scofflaws, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Nov. 10, 2001)
http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/capital/index.ssf?/newsstory/drive10.html.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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1. Ahmed Rassam
In late 1999, customs officials in Port Angeles, Washington were on
the lookout for Middle Eastern men when they stopped Ahmed Rassam,
an Algerian, after he crossed into the United States from Canada.106 A
search of his car yielded bomb-making materials that prosecutors later
said were intended for an attack on a Los Angeles airport.107
Investigators say the materials were similar to those used in attacks on
the American embassies in Africa. Rassam now faces 140 years in jail
and is said to be giving officials valuable information about Usama Bin
Laden’s terrorist network.108 “So,” notes John Stossel, “profiling
worked.”109
2. Richard Reid
During a December 2001 flight from Paris to Miami, a flight
attendant noticed Richard Reid – a British citizen and convert to Islam –
trying to ignite the soles of his shoes, which turned out to be made of
explosives. The flight attendant and other passengers succeeded in
subduing him.110 Mr. Reid also aroused the suspicion of airline
employees in Paris’s DeGaulle airport when he purchased a one-way
ticket in cash and did not check any luggage. The CEO of American
Airlines, Don Carty, stated, “Our people brought the passenger to the
attention of French authorities, and it was only after those authorities
cleared him, that he was allowed to board the flight on Saturday.”111
Despite being singled out for questioning twice, French authorities
eventually let Reid board the aircraft.112
This incident is an important lesson in several ways. First, Richard
Reid was not subjected to an administered and controlled profiling
procedure, so the French authorities had no reasonable grounds to detain
him. A profiling process could very well have resolved this problem.
Second, this incident demonstrates the necessity of scrutinizing both
objective characteristics (such as purchasing a one-way ticket with cash)
and subjective observations (such as suspicious behavior). Finally, this

106. Stossel, supra note 75, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/2020/2020/2020_011002_
racialprofiling_stossel.html.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. CNN, Authorities: Alleged Shoe Bomber Did Not Act Alone (Jan. 26, 2002)
http://asia.cnn.com/2002/US/01/25/reid.candiotti/.
111. Lisa Stark, Patching Up Security Holes, ABC NEWS (Dec. 24, 2001)
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/DailyNews/shoebomb_security011224.html .
112. Id.
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event demonstrates the differences, both in rationale and implementation,
between rational airport profiling and antagonistic profiling. Richard
Reid was not scrutinized because of his race,113 but because he
demonstrated several characteristics that, taken together, aroused
suspicion.114
IV. CHANGES IN AIRPORT SECURITY MEASURES
There is no silver bullet or quick fix for terrorism. No single program
or agency can protect U.S. interests from groups so enthralled with the
prospect of our destruction. America can and should, however, continue
to improve security measures at airports. This section evaluates some of
the changes taking place in airport security, including the profiling
procedures currently in place.
A. Airport Security Federalization Act
In November 2001, President Bush signed the Airport Security
Federalization Bill of 2001 into law. On January 18, 2002, airports across
the country implemented the first security measures designed to
“improve security at airports by requiring airlines to screen bags and
travelers for explosives, either through the use of high-tech bomb x-ray
devices, bag matching, random searches, manual searches or bombsniffing dogs.”115 One of the provisions of the Act is requires that a
computer-assisted passenger prescreening system “will be used to screen
all passengers, rather than just those who check in at a ticket counter.” 116
B. On-Site Security Measures: Profiling
In addition to indiscriminate security measures such as metal
detectors and baggage screening, airport profiling “permits investigators
to correlate a number of distinct data items in order to assess how close a
person . . . comes to a predetermined characterization or model of
infraction. The modal characteristics and behavior patterns of known
violations . . . are determined relative to the characteristics of others

113. “And who is Richard Reid? A Saudi? An Iraqi? An Afghan? Well, not exactly. Reid was
born in Bromley, Kent. His mother is British and his father believed to be of Jamaican origin.”
James Thurgood, A Breeding Ground for Terror (last visited Nov. 13, 2002) http://www.spearheaduk.com/0201-jt.html.
114. This is not to say that race shouldn’t be considered, but rather that it should not be the
sole or predominating factor in profiling methods.
115. John Whitehead, Terror In Our Airports (Jan. 26, 2002) http://www.worldnetdaily.com/
news/article.asp?article_id=26211.
116. Id.
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presumed to be nonviolators.”117 Suspected hijackers are profiled through
a comparison between these two groups. The most common profiling
model is “a simple laundry list of ‘red flag’ characteristics. As more and
more of these occur the case in question becomes more suspect. A
second, more in-depth, investigation is then carried out to determine if a
case that has been flagged as suspicious actually involves the
violation.”118
The modifications to profiling procedures suggested in this paper
help avoid the pitfalls inherent in other models (such as DWB). A
profiling process that incorporates all potentially useful factors is useful
in preserving civil liberties because no single indicator is definitive.
Rather, “their joint appearance is thought to be associated with an
increased probability that a violation will occur or has occurred.”119 For
example, “there is nothing illegal or exceptional about being [a middleeastern] male, purchasing a one-way airline ticket, paying for it with
cash, and obtaining the ticket at the last minute at the airport. But
analysis suggests that when these factors occur together, the chances of a
skyjacking attempt are increased.”120 In other words, as the court in U.S.
v. Lopez stated, while no single screening technique “can by itself
completely protect the flying public – without creating an objectionable
level of disturbance and inconvenience – probabilities are increased by
combining several approaches, thus sufficiently reducing the size of the
population which must ultimately be physically interfered with to a
practicable and socially acceptable level.”121
C. Suggested Modifications to Current Profiling Techniques
So-called “hijacker profiles”122 are intentionally kept secret to
prevent circumvention of identified hijacker characteristics. However,
testimony from cases which have challenged these procedures
demonstrate that hijacker profiles probably include information on how
the ticket is purchased (i.e. whether the ticket is one-way,123 purchased
with cash,124 purchased on the same day as the flight,125 etc.). Further, the
117. Gary T. Marx & Nancy Reichman, Routinizing the Discovery of Secrets: Computers as
Informants, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 423 (available at (visited March 26, 2002)
http://web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/secrets.html).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. U.S. v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
122. Charles G. Slepian, Security at Domestic Aviation Facilities (last visited Nov. 13, 2002)
http://www.frac.com/airline/ Domestic_Aviation_Facilities96.asp.
123. U.S. v. Dalpiaz, 494 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1974).
124. Four of the nineteen September 11 terrorists paid with cash. FBI, Press Release – 9/27/01
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court in Lopez found profiling and its attendant anti-hijacking procedures
to be constitutionally valid where:
• The profile has certain established characteristics in which
hijackers differ significantly from air-traveling public. 126
• Such characteristics are easily observed by airport personnel
without exercising judgment.127
• The profile does not use characteristics which discriminate
against any group on the basis of religion, origin, political
views, or race.128
Any addition to the profile which may introduce “an ethnic element
for which there is no experimental basis [raises] serious equal protection
problems . . . [and destroys] the essential neutrality and objectivity of the
approved profile.”129
The premise upon which the court in Lopez relied in barring
consideration of race is outmoded in regards to airport security. The
requisite “experimental basis” for introducing consideration of race (and,
presumably, gender and age) into profiling techniques was created on
September 11, 2001. “One hundred percent of the people who have
hijacked airliners for the purpose of mass-murdering Americans have
been Arab men.”130 Other characteristics131 which are currently subject
to profiling are not nearly as determinative or as useful for predictive
purposes. Therefore the FTSA should modify current profiling
procedures to incorporate race, gender, and age into the list of factors
which may trigger heightened scrutiny. These modified procedures
should be implemented with a sunset provision to ensure that such
measures do not last longer than the current circumstances require.
In order to ensure the constitutional and practical feasibility of such
modifications, airport security personnel should receive careful, precise
training to incorporate observations of these factors into their security
measures. Columnist Stuart Taylor suggests that this change of policy
could even be beneficial to minorities:
The [Bush] Administration cannot and should not cloak its profiling
policy in ambiguity . . . Unless the security people on the ground are
told clearly what they should and should not do, they may engage in
– Hijackers (Sept. 27, 2001) http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/092701hjpic.htm.
125. U.S. v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973).
126. John N. Glenn, Annotation, Validity, Under Federal Constitution, of Preflight
Procedures Used at Airports to Prevent Hijacking of Aircraft, 14 A.L.R. FED. 286, 290 (1973).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. U.S. v. Lopez, 328 F.Supp. 1101 n.28 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
130. Taylor, supra note 44, at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2001-09-25.htm.
131. See supra note 126.
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more (or less) racial profiling than safety requires. And if the
Administration uses racial profiling while pretending to reject it, the
message to police and citizens around the country will be that it’s OK,
as long as you lie about it.132

These modified procedures will expand the discretion given to
airport security personnel in regards to profiling, but the courts have
already demonstrated a willingness to allow such latitude. For example,
the broad discretion given to security personnel to execute searches
already extends to such amorphous grounds as “the mere presence of a
large, unidentifiable dark object in an x-ray picture of carryon
luggage,”133 a defendant’s “suspicious activity in the airport lounge
area,”134 even a “mere or unsupported suspicion.”135 A rational, openlyadministered and monitored profiling system that includes consideration
of race, gender, and age, is not nearly as expansive and far more
objective than “dark objects”136 or “mere suspicion.”137
V. VALID CONCERNS
There have been concerns aired over expansion or use of profiling.
Critics argue that profiling is a slippery slope that will result in
significant civil rights violations, and that such measures will be
ineffective.
As an example, Ashraf Khan was born in Pakistan and is currently an
American citizen. He is not an Arab.138 Not long ago he was seated on a
Delta Airlines flight to attend his brother’s wedding. He claims a Delta
pilot asked him to deplane, saying, “Mr. Khan, I want you to pick up
your luggage inside the plane and I don’t want you to fly with me on this
flight. Me and my crew made a decision that we are not secure flying

132. Taylor, supra note 44, at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2001-09-25.htm.
133. U.S. v. Clay, 638 F.2d 889, 890-91 (5th Cir. 1981).
134. U.S. v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 45 (5th Cir. 1973).
135. U.S. v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973).
136. Clay, 638 F.2d at 889.
137. Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276.
138. Many Americans harbor significant misconceptions of this portion of the world.
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran are all Muslim countries, yet none of them have significant Arab
populations. See CIA, The World Factbook: Afghanistan (last updated Jan. 1, 2002)
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html; CIA, The World Factbook: Pakistan , at
(last updated Jan. 1, 2002) http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pk.html; CIA, The
World Factbook: Iran (last updated Jan. 1, 2002) http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications
/factbook/geos/ir.html.
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with you.”139 Delta later issued a statement saying it is wrong to act
solely based on race.140
Profiling at airports constitutes a mere fraction of the efforts to
improve security since September 11, yet remains a subject of vigorous
debate. Mr. Khan’s experience typifies the legitimate concerns aroused
when race, gender, and age are injected into profiling modalities.
According to statistics from the ACLU and other sources, we are already
grappling with racial profiling in airport screening:
• Sixty-seven percent of the passengers subjected to personal
searches upon entering the United States were people of
color.141
• Black and Latino Americans were four to nine times as
likely as white Americans to be X-rayed after being frisked
or patted down.142
• Black women are more likely than any other U.S. citizens to
be strip-searched.143
Some opponents of airport profiling have suggested plausible
slippery slope consequences which may eventually result from profiling
race, gender, and age: “What about the dangers of terrorists smuggling
bombs or guns or box cutters onto buses or trains or subways or bridges,
or into tunnels or crowded stadiums or office buildings or schools or the
Capitol or Disneyland?”144 Another opponent of airport profiling
compares it to a genie escaping from a bottle:
Another problem with this approach is where does the profiling stop?
It’s fine to say, well, just at airports, but . . . that’s never the case—once
you let it out, it is very hard to put the profiling genie back in the bottle.
“Arab-looking men who drive vans and trucks will be profiled as well
as Arabs who access the Internet from public libraries; and those who
buy fertilizer at the Home Depot for their backyards. As for Arablooking men who decide to take flying lessons, they should forget
about it.”145

This is a reasonable concern, but the unique circumstances in which
profiling will take place make this type of scenario unlikely. First, the

139. Stossel, supra note 75, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/2020/2020/2020_
011002_racialprofiling_stossel.html.
140. Id.
141. American Civil Liberties Union, Press Release (last visited Mar. 26, 2002)
http://www.aclu.org /action/airprofile107.html.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Taylor, supra note 44, at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2001-09-25.htm.
145. Tom Regan, Racial Profiling is not the Answer to Security Concerns, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Oct. 4, 2001) http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1004/p25s2-coop.html.
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FTSA must limit application of profiling measures to areas within its
jurisdiction: airports and, perhaps eventually, to border crossings.
Second, profiling is already an openly and strictly administered
procedure. Victims of inappropriate profiling would be free to seek
redress for their injuries in the courts. Such a possibility would help to
ensure fair, rational application of profiling guidelines. Third, this
modified profiling system would have a sunset provision. If the threat of
terrorist attacks subsides, so would those measures adopted as a response
to them.
In addition to these slippery slope arguments, some opponents of
profiling have suggested that such a system is rendered ineffective by our
pluralistic society. Columnist John Derbyshire noted the difficulties of
deciding who is OMEA (“of middle eastern appearance”146) and who is
not:
OMEA is perhaps a more dubious description even than “black” or
“Hispanic.” You can see the difficulties by scanning the photographs of
the September 11 hijackers published in our newspapers. A few are
unmistakably OMEA. My reaction on seeing the photograph of the first
to be identified, Mohamed Atta, was that he looked exactly like my
own mental conception of an Arab terrorist. On the other hand, one of
his companions on AA Flight 11, Wail al-Shehri, is the spitting image
of a boy I went to school with — a boy of entirely English origins,
whose name was Hobson. Ahmed al-Nami (UA Flight 93) looks like a
147
Welsh punk rocker. And so on.

This argument depends on the assumption that profiling a
passenger’s race would be based solely on visual markers. This argument
also perpetuates the incorrect assumption that race would be the only
profiled characteristic. “Of middle eastern appearance”148 is a rather
broad category, and one susceptible to mistakes in judgment. However, a
profile that considers race and gender and age and other factors (when
the ticket was purchased, if the passenger paid cash, etc.) substantially
mitigates the chances of error. As with any security measure, profiling is
not an exact science. Metal detectors, bomb-sniffing dogs, and baggage
screening machines have all resulted in false alarms, yet no one suggests
that such deficiencies invalidate these precautions.

146. Derbyshire,
supra
/derbyshire100501.shtml.
147. Id.
148. Id.

note

47,

at

http://www.nationalreview.com/derbyshire
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VI. CONCLUSION
Profiling race, gender, and age is a sensitive topic in our society,
particularly in relation to September 11. Many of the arguments both for
and against this policy apparently derive from knee-jerk reactions to
anything resembling our discriminatory past. And yet frank discussion of
airport profiling may ultimately prove beneficial. As columnist John
Derbyshire noted, “Crises like [September 11] can generate hysteria . . .
but they can also have a clarifying effect on our outlook, sweeping away
the wishful thinking of easier times, exposing the hollowness of
relativism and moral equivalence, and forcing us to the main point.”149
Terrorism is a particularly horrible crime. The use – or threat – of
deadly violence against innocent civilians is “inherently . . .
intolerable”150 and “deserves absolute condemnation regardless of the
perpetrator or the motive.”151 Airport security measures constitute a
relatively small, though very important, part of our response to
September 11. Rational profiling of airline passengers – including
scrutiny of race, gender, and age – may be “an essential component . . .
of the effort to ensure that we see no more mass-murder-suicide
hijackings.”152 Columnist Stuart Taylor suggests a scenario which
perhaps helps “sweep away the wishful thinking of easier times.”153
[P]lease try a thought experiment: A few weeks hence, or a year hence,
you are about to board a cross-country flight. Glancing around the
departure lounge, you notice lots of white men and women; some black
men and women; four young, casually dressed Latino-looking men; and
three young, well-dressed Arab-looking men. Would your next thought
be, “I sure do hope that the people who let me through security without
patting me down didn’t violate Ashcroft’s policy by frisking any of
those three guys”? Or more like, “I hope somebody gave those three a
good frisking to make sure they didn’t have box cutters”? If the former,
perhaps you care less than I do about staying alive. If the latter, you
favor racial profiling—at least of Arab-looking men boarding
154
airliners.

Richard Kimble in the movie “The Fugitive” utilized all available
information to find the one-armed man. He narrowed his search to adult,

149. Id.
150. Colb, supra note 76, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20011010.html.
151. Serbian Government, The Fight Against Terrorism (June 1998) http://www.serbiainfo.com/news/kosovo/terrorism/fight.html.
152. Taylor, supra note 44, at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2001-09-25.htm.
153. Derbyshire, supra note 47, at http://www.nationalreview.com/derbyshire/Derbyshire
100501. shtml.
154. Taylor, supra note 44, at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2001-09-25.htm.
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one-armed males. Had Kimble failed to take such characteristics into
consideration, he would never have found his wife’s murderer.
Narrowing the pool of potential terrorist suspects at airports by profiling
race, gender, age, and other considerations could significantly improve
our chances of apprehending terrorists before they act. While some of
these measures may prove inconvenient, such costs must be weighed
against the greater societal interest.
R. Spencer Macdonald

